We consider the communication scenario where a source-destination pair wishes to keep the information secret from a relay node despite wanting to enlist its help. For this scenario, an interesting question is whether the relay node should be deployed at all. That is, whether cooperation with an untrusted relay node can ever be beneficial. We first provide an achievable secrecy rate for the general untrusted relay channel, and proceed to investigate this question for two types of relay networks with orthogonal components. For the first model, there is an orthogonal link from the source to the relay. For the second model, there is an orthogonal link from the relay to the destination. For the first model, we find the equivocation capacity region and show that answer is negative. In contrast, for the second model, we find that the answer is positive. Specifically, we show by means of the achievable secrecy rate based on compress-and-forward, that, by asking the untrusted relay node to relay information, we can achieve a higher secrecy rate than just treating the relay as an eavesdropper. For a special class of the second model, where the relay is not interfering itself, we derive an upper bound for the secrecy rate using an argument whose net effect is to separate the eavesdropper from the relay. The merit of the new upper bound is demonstrated on two channels that belong to this special class. The Gaussian case of the second model mentioned above benefits from this approach in that the new upper bound improves the previously known bounds. For the Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel, the new upper bound finds the secrecy capacity when the source-destination link is not worse than the source-relay link, by matching with achievable rate we present.
Throughout this paper, the following notation is used: ∀k, ε k denotes a variable that goes to 0 when n goes to ∞. C(x) = 1 2 log 2 (1 + x). X n denotes a vector of length n, whereas X i denotes the ith element of the vector. X ]i[ denotes the set {X j , 1 ≤ j < i or i < j ≤ n}. X i 1 denotes the set {X j , 1 ≤ j ≤ i}; the set is empty if i < 1. ⌊a⌋ denotes the largest integer less than or equal to a. The short hand W (a, ..., b) stands for the set {W (a), W (a + 1), ..., W (b)}. The short hand W a stands for the set {W (1), W (2), ..., W (a)}.
II. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE FOR THE GENERAL RELAY CHANNEL WITH CO-LOCATED EAVESDROPPER
The relay channel with a co-located eavesdropper was first considered in [20] and is shown in Figure 1 . It is a memoryless three-node relay channel [25] , whose description is p(Y, Y r |X, X r ).
X, X r are the channel inputs from the source and the relay respectively, and Y, Y r are the channel outputs observed by the destination and the relay respectively. We assume that there is an eavesdropper at the relay node who has access to everything that the relay node knows. The source wishes to send message W to the destination over n channel uses, while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper.
Without loss of generality, the relaying function for the ith channel use can be defined as
where A is a random variable which models any stochastic mapping employed by the relay node. Hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict g i to be a deterministic function.
The information available to the eavesdropper regarding the secret message W is {X 
. 
Remark 1: In general H(W |Y
where Z represents the i.i.d. binary noise.
It follows in this setting that, H(W |X n r , Y n r ) = 0. This is because the relay can always subtract the interference caused by X n r on its received signal and hence obtains X n . However, With this preparation, the equivocation rate region can be defined as follows: Let the message decoded by the destination beŴ . The equivocation rate region is composed of all rate pairs (R 1 , R e ) such that: Here |W | is the cardinality of the message set W . Note that when block Markov coding scheme [25] is used, the message is transmitted via successive blocks. In this case, W denotes the messages transmitted over all blocks. n should be the total number of channel uses of these blocks. The definition of X n r , Y n r should be adjusted accordingly. Next, we derive an achievable equivocation region based on compress-and-forward. Compressand-forward scheme was proposed in [25] and has been used for the relay network with an external eavesdropper in [13] , [26] . In our case, as we will see, the fact that the relay and the eavesdropper being co-located brings additional advantage to allow for a higher degree of compression to be achieved at the relay as compared to the setting in [13] .
H(W |Y
Theorem 1: For a relay network described as p(Y, Y r |X, X r ), with X, X r being the input from the source and the relay respectively, and Y r ,Y being the signals received by the relay and the destination respectively, the following region of rate pairs (R 1 , R e ) is achievable. 
and the union is taken over:
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 2:
Compared with the coding scheme presented in [13] , the difference is that we have Wyner-Ziv coding. Without Wyner-Ziv coding, the constraint (7) in the Theorem would be
which is identical to that in [13, Theorem 4 (12) ]. In [13] , the eavesdropper is external to the relay node, and hence only has a noisy copy of X n r (k). In this case, the equivocation over multiple blocks would not necessarily be the sum of equivocation over each block. Reference [13] worked around this problem by using a compress-and-forward scheme without Wyner-Ziv coding. The equivocation over multiple blocks was then lower bounded by proving that given the signal received by the eavesdropper and the secret message, the external eavesdropper would be able to determine the signals transmitted by the source and the relay via backward decoding
In contrast to that in [13] , fortunately, in our model, the eavesdropper has perfect knowledge of X n r (k). This enables us to compute the equivocation of N blocks from the equivocation of each block. See (137)-(139) in Appendix A. Hence, the Wyner-Ziv coding is used in our setting without difficulty.
Remark 3: Theorem 1 will be useful in Section V in finding an achievable rate for one of the models (Model 2) that we will describe in the next section.
Remark 4:
We can prefix the channel input X with U and apply Theorem 1 to the channel p(Y, Y r |U, X r ). The equivocation region then becomes:
for which (7) must be fulfilled, and the union is taken over:
Clearly, this may potentially enlarge the achievable region given by Theorem 1.
Having examined the general relay channel with a co-located eavesdropper, we next consider two special cases of it for which stronger results can be derived. The two models of the relay network with orthogonal components are depicted in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. Figure 3 shows Model 1. In this model, the relay and the source communicate with the destination via a multiple access channel, with its input being X D , X r and output being Y . The source and the relay communicate via a channel orthogonal to the channel used by the source and the relay to transmit to the destination. The input and the output of this channel are denoted by X R and Y r respectively. Thus, the overall channel description is:
The capacity of this network without secrecy constraints was found in [22] .
The Gaussian case of Model 1 is defined as [22] :
where Z 1 and Z are independent zero mean real Gaussian random variables each with variance N. a and b are channel gains. The transmit power constraints on the source and the relay are given by: Figure 4 shows Model 2. In Model 2, the source communicates with the relay and the destination via a broadcast channel, and the relay communicates with the destination via a separate (orthogonal) link. Thus, the channel is described by: When there are no secrecy constraints, the Gaussian case of Model 2 was considered in [23] .
The capacity of this channel remains an open problem except for some special cases given in [23] .
The class of channels for which we will be able to derive an upper bound on the secrecy rate, is described by:
Observe that such a channel is a special case of (15) since X r is dropped from the condition term of Y r in (15).
We will discuss two channels that fall into the class defined by (16) : (i) the Gaussian case of Model 2, (ii) the Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel [24] .
The Gaussian case of Model 2 is defined as:
where Z D , Z r , Z R are independent zero-mean Gaussian random variables with unit variance. a and b are channel gains. The transmit power of the source and the relay are constrained by:
The Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel is depicted in Figure 5 . The received signals at the destination and at the relay are given by:
where α is the channel gain and Z is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with unit variance.
Notice that the random variables representing the noise components have a correlation ρ = −1. receives from the source. The transmission power of the source is constrained to be:
In the following sections, we first derive the equivocation capacity region of Model 1. We then derive the achievable equivocation region for Model 2 using the results from Section II.
Finally, we derive the upper bound for the secrecy rate for the class of Model 2 defined in (16) and specialize it to the Gaussian case and the Cover-Kim channel.
IV. EQUIVOCATION CAPACITY REGION FOR MODEL 1
Theorem 2: The equivocation capacity region of Model 1 is given by
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 5: Theorem 2 is proved by specializing the results from [21] . The achievable scheme is based on partial-decode-and-forward. This entails that the relay decodes the information transmitted via X R . The scheme is outlined next for the sake of completeness: r (k) before the kth block starts. It locates the part of the codebook C R which is generated according to X n r (k) and transmits the message W R (k) using this part of the codebook. The source also locates the part of the codebook C D which is generated according to X n r (k) and transmits the message W D (k) using this part of the codebook. The destination can successfully decode W R (k − 1) from Y n (k), which determines X n r (k), due to the fact that the cardinality of {W R (k)} is smaller than 2 nI(Xr;Y ) . Then it locates the part of the codebook in C D that is generated according to X n r (k) and use it to decode
This is possible due to the fact that the cardinality of {W D (k)} is smaller than 2 nI(X D ;Y |Xr) .
Remark 6:
By letting R e = R 1 in (21), we obtain the secrecy capacity of the network given by (22) .
= max
It is readily seen that in this case the relay to destination link is not useful. Additionally, when R e < R 1 , from the coding scheme outlined in Remark 5, the secret information, W D (k), is only mapped to signal transmitted via X D , which means the secret information does not pass through the relay node at all. These two observations combined lead to the conclusion that the relay-to-destination link is indeed not useful in improving the secrecy rate of the system, and that the untrusted relay should not be deployed at all.
A direct extension of the above result can be readily made to the Gaussian channel.
1
Corollary 1: For the Gaussian relay network described above, the equivocation region is given by (24) .
Proof: The proof is the same as in reference [22, Section III] . The three terms:
are maximized simultaneously when X r , X D , X R are chosen to be zero mean and jointly Gaussian with the following parameters:
In this section, we present the achievable equivocation rate region for Model 2.
Theorem 3: For Model 2 defined by (15) , an achievable equivocation rate region is given by:
where
Proof: We use Theorem 1. In particular, region (25) follows from (6) by letting Y = {Y D , Y R } and using the following two Markov chains (28) and (29) . (29) follows from the fact that {X r , Y R } is independent from Y D as shown by (27) .
It then follows from (28) and (29) 
Next, we apply Theorem 3 to the Gaussian case, which is defined by (17) .
Corollary 2:
For the Gaussian relay network with orthogonal components defined by (17), the following rate region is achievable.
Proof:
, and Z Q is independent from all the other variables. Substituting the distribution of (26), we find that we need
It is clear from (31) that to make the region as large as possible, σ 2 Q should be as small as possible, and (32) ensures this.
Remark 7:
Suppose a > 1. Without the channel between relay and destination, we have a wiretap channel where the eavesdropper has a better channel. Hence, the secrecy capacity is zero [27] . We also know that a non-zero secrecy rate cannot be achieved with decode-andforward. However, if the relay to destination gain, b, is large enough, a non-zero secrecy rate can be achieved with compress-and-forward, as can be seen from (31) . This is an example where the relay-to-destination link helps to achieve a non-zero secrecy rate when the relay and the eavesdropper are co-located. Thus, the untrusted relay is useful and should be cooperated with.
The Equivalent Wiretap Channel of Model 2 using Amplify-and-forward Relaying
Remark 8: The scheme we present here differs from the noise forwarding scheme of [13] where the relay transmits noise that is independent from its received signal. By contrast, in this work, the signal transmitted by the relay is computed from its received signal.
Remark 9:
The amplify and forward scheme can also be used at the relay. Let p be the average transmission power of the source node. Then, in this case, the signal transmitted by the relay at the ith channel use is given by
Note that in (34), we force X r,i to depend on the signal received in the previous channel use Y r,i−1 in order to preserve the causality of the relay function as defined in (1). However, because the channel between the relay and the destination is orthogonal to the one between the source and the destination, the fact that the signals received via Y R is delayed by one channel use compared to those received via Y D does not make any difference to the destination. Therefore, it is safe to write X r = βY r and omit the subscript i.
The relay network is therefore equivalent to a Gaussian wiretap channel as shown in Figure 6 .
The achievable secrecy rate is computed from
for a Gaussian distribution for X: X ∼ N (0, p) and when maximized over p, the secrecy rate is given by:
where for β defined in (34), ξ is given by Observe that amplify-and-forward can also achieve a non-zero secrecy rate given a large enough b. However, comparing it to (31), we find that the secrecy rate given by amplify-and-forward is strictly smaller than the secrecy rate achievable by compress-and-forward.
Remark 10:
When there are no secrecy constraints, for compress-and-forward/amplify-andforward, the source should always transmit at maximum power. However, when there are secrecy constraints, for compress-and-forward/amplify-and-forward, the source may not transmit at maximum power. This can be shown as follows.
We first look at the case where there are no secrecy constraints. The rate for compress-andforward follows from the maximum possible value of R 1 in Corollary 2, which is
where σ 2 Q is given by (32) . Recall that p is the average transmission power of the source node. Hence we only need to show that
is a monotonic function of p which is proved in Appendix C. Hence to maximize R 1 we should
The rate for amplify-and-forward is derived by ignoring the eavesdropper in Figure 6 . The achievable rate is I(X; Y R Y D ), which, using the Gaussian input distribution for X, equals
where ξ is given by (36) . To prove that (39) is maximized at p = P 1 , it is sufficient to prove that ξp is a monotonically increasing function of p, which can be shown by rewriting ξp as:
When there are secrecy constraints, the secrecy rate is not necessarily maximized at p = P 1 .
This can be observed in particular when b (the relay to destination link gain) is small. In this case, for compress-and-forward, as shown in (32), the quantization noise σ 2 Q will increase more rapidly with source power p. Similarly, for amplify-and-forward, the ξ in (36) will decrease more rapidly with source power p. This, along with the negative term −C(a 2 p) present in (31) (35), may offset the benefits of having a larger source power p. This phenomenon is demonstrated numerically in Figure 7 , where the source-to-relay channel gain a = 1.2. Both compress-andforward and amplify-and-forward can achieve a larger secrecy rate when power control is used at the source. Moreover, compared to compress-and-forward, amplify-and-forward benefits more from judicious power allocation at the source.
VI. UPPER BOUND FOR THE SECRECY RATE OF A SPECIAL CLASS OF MODEL 2

A. The Enhanced Channel
In this section, we describe the general methodology that we use to derive the upper bound.
Our upper bound involves introducing a second eavesdropper. The focus of this section is to investigate the sufficient condition such that doing so will not decrease the secrecy capacity of the channel. In Section VI-B, this will be useful in finding the upper bound for the secrecy rate for a class of channels conforming to Model 2.
We focus on the case there is no feedback from the relay's output X r to its input Y r , which means the conditional probability distribution of the channel should have the following form:
Note that due to the absence of feedback, we drop the term X r from the conditioning of Y r .
The reason that we choose this distribution to study will be clear shortly. Deriving the outer bound entails a "relay-eavesdropper separation" argument. In other words, the net effect of this argument is to change the eavesdropper that is co-located with relay node, to an eavesdropper that is external to the relay node. Illustrated in Figure 8 , this means:
1) We add a second eavesdropper to the relay network, who sees a channel that is statistically equivalent to the channel seen by the relay node. Let the signal received by this second eavesdropper be Y e . That is, we have:
2) We remove the first eavesdropper.
The reader, at this point, rightfully should question the validity of step 1). This is because, as mentioned earlier, introducing a second eavesdropper, can decrease secrecy rate in general, even if the second eavesdropper observes a statistically equivalent channel as in (42). This is because the second eavesdropper may be able to hear the transmission signal X r of the first eavesdropper, and these two eavesdroppers can potentially cooperate. An example is provided
in Appendix D to demonstrate this phenomenon.
We next show that, for the channel model in (41), introducing a second eavesdropper, if done with care, will not alter the secrecy capacity of the system. In particular, let the received signal of the "second" eavesdropper Y e be defined as follows:
Note that the second equality in (44) is (42) specialized for (41). We reiterate that though a Y e conforming to these conditions may not exist for any arbitrary relay network, for the Gaussian relay network models we are interested in, such a Y e can be found, as will be seen in the sequel (See (86), (110), (113)).
For this choice of Y e , we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4: For the relay channel defined by (41), (43)- (44) are sufficient for the secrecy capacity of the channel after introducing the second eavesdropper to remain identical to the secrecy capacity of the original channel.
Proof: Due to the addition of the second eavesdropper, we know that the secrecy capacity of the new channel ≤ the secrecy capacity of the original channel. Therefore, we only need to
show that the secrecy capacity of the new channel ≥ the secrecy capacity of the original channel.
We use q to denote any distribution related to the new channel, and p for any distribution related to the original channel. Suppose the new channel uses the exact same coding scheme and the same message set {W } as the original channel. Then we can make the following statements:
1) Suppose W can be reliably received by the destination at a rate of R e in the original channel. Then it must be reliably received by the receiver at the same rate in the new channel as well, because these two channels share the same coding scheme and the same channel statistics.
2) The transmitted message W is still secret from the first eavesdropper co-located with the relay, since we are using the exact same coding scheme of the original channel.
3) We next show that H(W |Y 2 It is understood in the case of continuous random variable, the sum should be replaced by integral. In fact, both of them can be expressed as integral by defining the measure properly. 20 First we state two Markov chains, which are proved in Appendix E.
We have:
Here step (a) follows from the Markov chain
Step (b) follows from the fact that these two channels share the same coding scheme, p(X n |W ) = q(X n |W ), and the constraint we placed on the marginal distribution q(Y e |X) = p(Y r |X).
Step (c)
r,1 . The fact that introducing an eavesdropper does not reduce the secrecy capacity can then be seen from the following relationship:
If lim I (W ; Y n e ) = 0. Therefore, for a given coding scheme, if W is kept secret from the eavesdropper at the relay, it is also kept secret from the newly introduced eavesdropper. Hence any secrecy rate achievable in the original channel is achievable after introducing the second eavesdropper. This means the secrecy capacity remains the same. Theorem 4 shows that if the relay is not self-interfering, adding an eavesdropper as described in step 1 will not incur any loss in secrecy rate. This, along will step 2, will result in an "enhanced" channel whose secrecy rate is an upper bound to that of the original channel.
Remark 11: Actually, for the channel model in (41), we have
This means the secrecy capacity of the channel model in can be computed via lim n→∞ is left intact. The benefit of the separation argument is that we have freedom in choosing Y e , as long as it conforms to (43) and (44). Choosing Y e properly allows us to tighten the bound.
B. Upper Bound for a Special Class of Model 2
We next use the result we derived in Section VI-A to upper bound the secrecy rate of a class of relay channels. This class, as we mentioned earlier, is given by (16) , which can be specialized from (41). Equation (43) becomes: With this definition, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5: For the relay channel defined in (16) , where the relay is the eavesdropper, the secrecy rate R e is upper bounded by
Proof: The first term can be obtained by specializing the result from [21] . Reference [21, version 7,(13)] claims for a general relay p(Y, Y r |X, X r ), the secrecy rate is upper bounded by
Specializing it to our channel, which means replacing Y with Y D , Y R , we have
From (55), X − {Y r , X r } − Y R is a Markov chain. Hence (60) equals:
From (55),
Hence we have proved the first term.
Next, we proceed to bound the second term:
Here step (a) follows from Fano's inequality.
Step (b) follows from the relay destination link being orthogonal to the rest part of the channel.
Step (c) follows from the fact that the relay is not interfering the second eavesdropper. Therefore given {Y e,i , X i }, the signals {Y e,j , j > i} do not provide further information about Y D,i .
Remark 13:
Another upper bound that can be obtained is
which is proved in Appendix G, and it can be further tightened by choosing Y e . However, as
shown below this upper bound does not improve the first term in (57).
Step (b) follows from p(Y r |X) = p(Y e |X).
C. The Gaussian Case of Model 2
Using Theorem 5, we now evaluate the upper bound for the Gaussian channel.
Corollary 3:
For the Gaussian case of Model 2, which has independent noise components, the upper bound on secrecy rate is:
Proof: First we notice that (57) is upper bounded by: In Figure 9 , we compare the upper bound with the achievable rates for the Gaussian case of Model 2. We fix the source-to-relay channel gain a = 1, and vary the relay-to-destination channel gain b. As b → ∞, we observe that the upper bound becomes tight. As b → 0, the upper bound decreases. This improvement is due to the first term in Corollary 3.
VII. THE COVER-KIM DETERMINISTIC RELAY CHANNEL
In this section, we investigate the Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel of [24] , [28] whose capacity is established therein. The channel was defined in Figure 5 in Section III.
For the achievable secrecy rate, we have the next theorem.
Theorem 6: For the Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic channel, the following secrecy rate is achievable:
Proof: Let C be a random code book with 2 ⌊n[R 0 +C(P )−C(α 2 P )] + ⌋ 2 ⌊nC(α 2 P )⌋ codewords sampled from an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance P . These codewords are randomly partitioned into 2 ⌊n[R 0 +C(P )−C(α 2 P )] + ⌋ bins of equal size. The bin index of the transmitted codeword is determined by the message W . The actual transmitted codeword is then selected randomly from this bin according to a uniform distribution. The relay uses either hashand-forward or compress-and-forward as described in [24] . Let E[P e |C] be the average error probability over the codebook ensemble {C} that the destination could not correctly determine X n , hence W , from Y n D and side information provided by the relay. It was proved in [24] that lim n→∞ E[P e |C] = 0.
Since each bin is a Gaussian codebook by itself whose rate is below the AWGN channel capacity between the source and the relay, the relay node can determine X n given W and Y n r with high probability using jointly typical decoding. Therefore, from Fano's inequality, we have
Since each code word is selected with equal probability, we have
. Substituting this and (95) into (94), dividing it by n and taking the limit n → ∞, we have (87), which equals lim n→∞ 1 n H(W |C). Therefore lim n→∞ E[P e |C] + 1 n I(W ; Y n r |C) = 0. Since both terms inside the limit are non-negative, this proves the existence of at least one codebook with a rate of [R 0 + C (P ) − C (α 2 P )] + such that both terms are arbitrarily small. Hence we have proved the theorem.
Theorem 7:
The secrecy rate of the Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic channel is upper bounded by
Proof: We use Theorem 4 to separate the eavesdropper and the relay. Let Y e be the signal received by the eavesdropper such that (55) and (56) are met. Then, we have:
Step (a) follows from Fano's inequality.
Step (b) follows from the fact that the relay is not interfering with, i.e., heard by the (second) eavesdropper. Therefore, given {Y e,i , X i }, signals {Y e,j , j > i} will not provide more information about Y D,i .
The bound is further tightened by choosing Y e properly.
1) If α ≥ 1, then
Z ′ is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with variance |1 − 1 α 2 |, and Z ′ is independent from Z.
2) If α ≤ 1, then
Substituting these choices of Y e into (109), we get (96).
Remark 14:
Inspecting (87) and (96), we see that the upper bound and the achievable rate coincide when α ≤ 1. Hence, for α ≤ 1, i.e, when the source to destination link is not worse than the source to the relay link, the secrecy capacity is achieved by compress-and-forward.
Remark 15:
The secrecy capacity can exceed the direct link capacity if R 0 > C(P ). This is a benefit of the correlation of the noises corrupting the links from the source. If the noises are independent, the secrecy capacity cannot exceed C(P ), as proved next:
Observation 1: If the relay channel has the property:
Then Proof: From (57), we have
where in (117) we use the Markov chain
We conclude this section by presenting Figure 10 which shows the upper bound and the achievable rate for R 0 = 0.5 bits/channel use and P = 1. As expected, the two meet for α ≤ 1, yielding the secrecy capacity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the relay channel with an untrusted relay that is treated as an eavesdropper. In particular, we focused on two relay channel models with orthogonal components. For the first model, we have found the capacity-equivocation region and proved that the relay-destination link does not help in increasing secrecy rate, and therefore the untrusted relay should not be deployed if perfect secrecy is desired. In contrast, for the second model, we have found an achievable secrecy rate which calls relay's cooperation and improves the secrecy rate as compared to treating it simply as an eavesdropping node. Thus, we conclude that, for this model, the untrusted relay may help the source and the destination to communicate despite being subjected to the secrecy constraint, and that cooperation with the untrusted relay is beneficial.
We have provided a channel transformation that separates the relay and the eavesdropper to upper bound the secrecy rate for a special class of untrusted relay channels. We have found this approach to be useful in upper bounding the secrecy rate for two cases: For the Gaussian relay channel with an orthogonal relay-destination link, this new approach yields a computable bound that tightens previously known bounds. For the Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel,
we have shown that this approach finds the secrecy capacity when the source-destination link is not worse than the source-relay link.
Since the first example demonstrating the potential benefit of cooperating with an untrusted relay [29] , there has been recent growing interest in communication models with untrusted relays.
Notable recent developments include work on the multiple access channel with generalized feedback [30] and relay broadcast channel [31] , [32] , where, in addition to the secret message considered in this work, the untrusted relay node has its own secret message. The role of untrusted relay is examined in bi-directional communication in [33] , [34] , where the relay node in a twoway relay network is untrusted. A case for the communication scenario with multiple untrusted relay nodes is recently presented in [35] , [36] , where the source and the destination can only communicate via a chain of untrusted relay nodes. All these works, like this paper we are about to conclude, speaks to the merit of cooperative communication even with untrusted partners, and that cooperation and secrecy can go hand in hand.
The achievable scheme of Theorem 1 is a combination of stochastic encoding at the source node and compress-and-forward at the relay node. The compress-and-forward relaying scheme is the same one described in [25] . The achievable scheme involves N blocks of channel uses.
Each block is composed of n channel uses.
A. Codebook Generation 1) The Codebook of the Source Node:
The source uses a codebook composed of i.i.d.
sequences sampled from the distribution p(X). Each codeword has n components. In order to confuse the relay/eavesdropper, the codebook is further partitioned randomly to bins. Suppose there are 2 nC bins. Each bin contains 2 nB codewords. B is chosen such that:
The reason behind this choice will be clear shortly. Each codeword is hence indexed by the label {b, c}, where c is the bin index and b indexes the codeword within the bin. The rate of the codebook is given by
2) The Codebook of the Relay [25] :
i) The signal transmitted by the relay is from a codebook composed of i.i.d. sequences sampled from the distribution p(X r ). Each codeword has n components and is denoted by
The codebook has 2 nD codewords.
ii) For each d, we generate 2 nE codewords, each with n components, denoted byŶ r (e|d).
The ith component of the codeword is drawn from p(Ŷ r |X r = X We use C to denote the random codebooks generated for the source and the relay.
B. Stochastic Encoder at the Source Node
The codeword transmitted as the kth block is indexed by label b k , c k , where c k is the bin index and b k indexes the codeword within the bin. Let W (k) be the message transmitted at the kth block. Recall that R 1 is the rate of the message W (k). Hence R 1 = log 2 |W (k)|/n. The messages are mapped to the codewords as follows.
i) If R 1 > C, c k is the bin index determined by W (k). The codewords in bin c k are partitioned into 2 n(R 1 −C) subsets. The subset is chosen according to the unmapped part of W (k). Then b k is selected from this chosen subset according to a uniform distribution.
ii) If R 1 ≤ C, c k is still determined by W (k). b k is randomly chosen from group c k according to a uniform distribution.
For this mapping, we observe that the cardinality of c k is 2 n min{R 1 ,C} .
Only N − 1 messages W (1)...W (N − 1) are transmitted over N blocks. During the last block, the relay and the source agrees that the source will send message 1.
C. Compress-and-forward at the relay [25]
During the kth block, the relay node first compresses Y n r (k) toŶ n r (e k |d k ).Ŷ n r is indexed by two labels: e k and d k . d k is chosen to be the label that corresponds to X n r (k). Hence a different set ofŶ n r , of size 2 nE , is used for compression depending on the value of X n r (k). The label e k is chosen to be the first element in the following set:
If the set is empty, e k = 1. The size of the codebookŶ n r (e|d k ) should be sufficiently large for the set to be nonempty, which requires E > I(Ŷ r ; Y r |X r ) [25] .
Label e k is transmitted during the k+1st block. At this time the destination has received Y n (k), and can decode X n r (k). Since {Y n (k), X n r (k)} provide side information to the destination about e k , e k can be compressed further before transmission. This is done via Wyner-Ziv coding. Recall that the set {e, d = d k } is randomly binned. The size of each bin should be chosen such that the destination can decode e k , and hence determineŶ 
. For details, the reader is referred to [25, Theorem 6] .
Let the decoding result beX n(N −1) . According to error probability analysis in [25] , if the rate of the codebook of the source meets the condition:
and the following condition is fulfilled:
The expectation is taken over the random codebook C.
Combining (122) and (120), we have:
The destination then computesŴ N −1 fromX n(N −1) , since the former is a deterministic function of the latter. The average probability of decoding error for W n(N −1) is hence upper bounded by the average probability of decoding error of X n(N −1) . Therefore equation (124) implies:
From the coding scheme described in Section A-C, we observe Y n r (i) depends on {Y
is a Markov chain. Therefore (147) equals:
where where ε 2 > 0 and lim n→∞ ε 2 = 0. Equation (151) follows from the fact the channel is memoryless and the codebook is composed of i.i.d. sequences.
Applying (142), (136) and (151) to (133), we have
Equation (154) follows from (140). (155) is because c k in each block is chosen independently of other blocks, c k is chosen according to a uniform distribution from a set with a cardinality of 2 n min{C,R 1 } .
From (152)- (155), we have:
Combining it with (126) we have
Therefore, there must exists a codebook C * such that
Since each term on the left side of (158) are nonnegative, it follows that with this codebook:
For the simplicity of notation, we omit C * from the conditioning term. It is understood that all the derivations below are conditioned on C * .
Since c N −1 is a deterministic function of W N −1 , we have
Hence,
The achievable region can then be discussed for two cases:
where lim n→∞ C meets the following condition from (125):
subject to the constraint I(X r ; Y ) > I(Ŷ r ; Y r |Y X r ). When R 1 > lim n→∞ C, the region (R 1 , R e ) is given by:
Finally, the union of these two regions (166) and (168) becomes the region given below:
with the constraint I(X r ; Y ) > I(Ŷ r ; Y r |Y X r ).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The converse for R 1 is given in [22] using the cut set bound. The converse for R e can be derived by specializing the upper bound in [21] , which is stated in (58) as I(X; Y |X r , Y r ). For our model, this can be upper bounded as:
From (12), Y − X D , X r − Y r , X R is a Markov chain. Hence (171) equals:
Hence we have proved the converse for R e .
The achievability of (21) 
In (175), we let X = {X D , X R }, U = X R , and restrict the union to be over the probability distributions of the form p(X r )p(X D |X r )p(X R |X r ), and we obtain:
where step (a) follows from X R − X r − Y being a Markov chain [22] and X R − X r X D − Y being a Markov chain.
Step (b) follows from X D − X R X r − Y r being a Markov chain [22] .
Moreover, the bound on R 1 can be expressed as:
(c)
where step (c) follows from U − XX r − Y being a Markov chain.
Note that (185) is the same as [22, (2) ], therefore from the same argument therein, we obtain:
By substituting (187) and (182) into (175), we find that the rate pair in (21) is achievable. 
Since p +
is always positive, we can prove its monotonicity in p by showing ln(p +
is monotonically increasing in p. From (188), it is given by
. Then the derivative of (189) with respect to p is given by
Note that A, B > a 2 . Hence the denominator of (190) is positive. Therefore we only need to
show that the numerator of (190) is positive. The numerator of (190) equals 
This is a Gaussian relay channel with orthogonal components with reversely correlated noise.
N is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with unit variance. Hence its probability density function is symmetric around the origin: p(−N) = p(N).
We first observe that since the orthogonal link between the relay and the destination is noiseless, the optimal relaying scheme in this case is choosing X r,i = Y r,i−1 . This can be proved as follows: First we recognize, for this channel, given Y n r , the signals X n r do not provide more information to the eavesdropper. This is because the relay is not interfering itself and hence as shown in Remark 11, the secrecy capacity can be computed from lim n→∞ 1 n H(W |Y n r ) instead, i.e., X n r can be dropped from the conditioning term. Therefore for any given relay scheme, we can always use X r,i = Y r,i−1 to give the destination the signals received by the relay, and ask the destination to to compute the X n r generated from the original relaying scheme instead. It can be verified that in this way the secrecy constraint is fulfilled and W can still be transmitted reliably.
Therefore, the secrecy rate achievable by any given relay scheme is achievable via X r,i = Y r,i−1 , which must be the optimal relaying scheme.
Hence the destination essentially receives (Y r,i−1 , Y D,i ) at the ith channel use and the eavesdropper receives Y r . The channel is therefore equivalent to a 1 × 2 MIMO wiretap channel [4] .
Note that the destination can remove the noise N i completely by simply computing Y r,i + Y D,i .
The eavesdropper, on the other hand, observes an AWGN link with finite capacity. Hence the secrecy capacity of this channel is easily seen to be ∞. Now, we construct a second relay channel. The channel is the same as the previous one except that the received signal at the relay becomes:
{Y r , X r } = {X + N, X r }
That is to say that the relay receives an additional copy of its transmitted signal. This should not benefit the relay/eavesdropper at all. So the secrecy capacity is still ∞ . Now, we construct a third relay channel from the second relay channel, by adding one more eavesdropper to the model. Let the signal received by this second eavesdropper be:
It follows that p(Y e |X, X r ) = p(X − N, X r |X, X r ) = p(−N) = p(N) = p(Y r |X, X r ). Hence, the new eavesdropper observes the same marginal distribution as the eavesdropper located at the relay node. However, this eavesdropper receives exactly the same signal received by the destination. Therefore the secrecy capacity of the new system is reduced to 0. 
Dividing both sides by n and letting n → ∞, we have the upper bound in (79).
